On 29 October 2025, the High Court handed down judgment in Khamba v Harrow Council [2025] EWHC 2803. For the first time, the court extended the principles set out in Poole v GN [2019] UKSC 25 and HXA v Surrey County Council [2023] UKSC 52 beyond children’s services and into adult social services, specifically the mental health sphere.
There is the potential for the principles in Khamba to apply to a public officer, when carrying out a statutory assessment or function.
The High Court held that Approved Mental Health Professionals (AMPHs), (for whom local authorities are generally responsible), do not owe a common law duty of care when undertaking assessments for detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the ‘MHA 1983’). This was for two reasons: (i) a duty of care would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme under the MHA 1983 (E v East Berkshire); and (ii) there is no assumption of responsibility when undertaking a statutory assessment.
Importantly, the court did not accept that the assessed person was a client or patient of the AMHP, despite AMHPs commonly being mental health nurses or mental health social workers, for which they are performing clinical roles.
There is no previous authority on the point. The court reached its conclusions and was strident in its approach that this was not an emerging area of law that required a trial. It was affirmed that the principles in Poole, HXA and other recent Supreme Court authorities are well established.
The claimants failed to seek permission to sue Harrow under s.139(2) of the MHA 1983. The entirety of the claims for all three claimants were struck out and declared a nullity.
However, the court went even further asserting that the common law claims would have been struck out in any event.
The Judge found most of the Human Rights Act (the HRA) claims were amenable to strike out. Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 specifically, for a range of reasons (see paragraphs 149 to 159 of the judgment).
No operational duty for the HRA claim was owed to claimant two as the local authority did not know she lived with claimant one or claimant three and had not been named in the records. Claimant two’s Article 8 HRA claim was disposed of for the same reasons as Article 3 - the local authority did not know, nor ought it to have known, of the risk, whether of inhuman or degrading treatment or to her physical and moral integrity.
All of claimant three’s HRA claim was also struck out. As the person committing the attack, he could not be said to have suffered ill-treatment whether under Articles 3 or 8.
Claimant three also sought to argue that his HRA claim could survive via claimant one as he was an indirect victim, even if he had not suffered any direct breach of his own rights. The High Court affirmed there is no place for a secondary or other victim claim under the HRA.
Implications and considerations
First and foremost, the case brings significant extra protection to AMHPs: (i) permission needed to bring a claim; (ii) no common law duty of care owed. This will invariably affect every AMPH in the country, reducing the risk of claims being instigated against them.
The case also has the potential to extend the Poole/HXA principles, in effect, to any public officer carrying out a statutory assessment for the benefit of a public body. They do not owe a common law duty of care and the principles in Poole are not reserved for children’s social service functions.
A robust approach can be considered earlier on when defending such claims. This means strike out considerations can be made earlier in a case to potentially prune it, narrowing the issues in the case and/or obtaining sizeable costs orders.
The judgment is also helpful in demonstrating how Article 3 and Article 8 claims are intertwined in practice. Further, there is no place for secondary victim claims under the HRA 1998. The person who suffered the infringement needs to bring the claim unless they are deceased or unable to bring a claim themselves for some other reason.
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court case of Lewis-Ranwell (Respondent) v G4S Health Services (UK) Ltd and Devon Partnership NHS Trust and Devon County Council (Appellants) [2026] UKSC 2 has since held that where a person deliberately and unlawfully kills and has been acquitted by the reason of insanity, that person was barred from using the defence of illegality. This means he could not sue mental health services for allegedly failing to treat him properly.
This shows the Supreme Court reinforcing the integrity of the law, in both the criminal and civil justice systems spheres.
